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WAIVING GOOD-BYE TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS ALONG THE ARIZONA
BORDERLANDS
Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff '
I. INTRODUCTION
The Arizona borderlands contain some of the most beautiful and
unique landscapes in the United States. The Sky Island Ecosystem
consists of green lush mountains surrounded by an ocean of desert habitat.
The contrast of these forested mountain areas against the open arid desert
valleys supports a unique ecosystem of plants and wildlife, from the jaguar
to the organ pipe cactus. 2 This southern border has been described as "a
great biological unity, with a meat cleaver of laws shredding it and cutting
it in half."3
In the early 1990s, efforts to control undocumented immigration
shifted from populated border areas such as El Paso, Texas to the remote
borderlands of Arizona.4 The shift resulted in significant degradation of
the diverse natural habitats of many plants and wildlife. These areas are
now further threatened by the border fence construction and the broad
waiver of environmental laws that once protected these lands from
destruction.
When the Secretary of the Homeland Security waived numerous
environmental laws along the southern borderlands in October of 2007,
the Defenders of Wildlife and the Sierra Club filed suit against various
government agencies and officials.5 The Plaintiffs attempted to enjoin the
border fence construction and require compliance with waived
' 527 F.Supp.2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007).
2 DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, ON THE LINE: THE IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY ON
WILDLIFE AND HABITAT IN THE ARIZONA BORDERLANDS 7 (2006).
http://www.defenders.org/resources/publications/programs-andpolicy/habitatconservat
ion/federallands/onthelinereport.pdf [hereinafter On the Line]
3 Audio Internet Series: Charles Bowden, The Undocumented War: A Marketplace
Special. Part V (2005), http://marketplace.publicradio.org/features/undocumentedwar.
4 On the Line, supra note 2, at 6.
s Amended Complaint at 5, Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.Supp.2d 119
(D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-1801).
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environmental laws. 6 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
found in favor of the government agencies and officials in a decision that
creates severe environmental consequences and deep constitutional
concerns.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2006, the Secure Fences Act authorized the Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS") to build a double-layer wall along
approximately 700 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border to discourage illegal
crossing.8  A long section of the wall crosses into federally protected
lands, includin the San Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area ("San
Pedro NCA"). The San Pedro NCA, located in southern Arizona, is a
biologically diverse area containing one of the last undammed, free-
flowing rivers in the United States.' 0
On August 10, 2007, the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
submitted a right-of-way application on behalf of DHS to build fencing
and roads along the San Pedro NCA's southern boundary." The Bureau
of Land Management's ("BLM") environmental assessment decision
found that the fencing would not cause significant environmental impact
and authorized construction along the southern boundary of the San Pedro
NCA,12 which began on October 3, 2007.13
The plaintiffs, Defenders of Wildlife and the Sierra Club, are
environmental organizations dedicated to protecting wild animals and
6 id.
7 Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.Supp.2d 119,121 (D.D.C. 2007).
8 Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 3, 120 Stat. 2638,2638-39.
9 Amended Complaint at 1, Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.Supp.2d 119
(D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-1801).
'
0 Id. at 5.
" Id.
12 Chertoff 527 F.Supp.2d at 121. However, for 1,490 feet within the river and its
floodplain temporary vehicle barriers would be installed and for 275 feet of dray washer
along the NCA boundary permanent vehicle barriers would be installed. Amended
Complaint at 5-6, Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.Supp.2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007)
(No. 07-1801).
13 Amended Complaint at 7, Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.Supp.2d 119
(D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-1801)..
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plants in their natural communities.14 The plaintiffs filed suit on October
5, 2007, against the Department of Homeland Security and its secretary,
Michael Chertoff, the Bureau of Land Management and its director, Jim
Caswell, the Department of the Interior ("DOI") and its secretary Dirk
Kempthorne, and the Army Corps of Engineers and its Commander and
Chief of Engineers, Robert L. Van Antwep.' 5 The plaintiffs also moved
for a temporary restraining order. The organizations argued that the
agencies performed an environmental assessment without public
involvement and without properly considering the impacts of the wall and
road building activities on the environment. 16 Plaintiffs claimed that the
defendants were violating the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
("NEPA"), the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act, and the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA").17
On October 10, 2007, the district court found a substantial
likelihood of success of the merits for the plaintiffs and issued the
temporary restraining order temporarilZ enjoining the defendants from any
construction in the San Pedro NCA. However, pursuant to the waiver
authority granted to him in Section 102(c)(1) of the Real ID Act, the
Secretary Chertoff waived nineteen environmental laws in connection with
the border wall construction on October 26, 2007.19 Upon notification of
the waiver, the court vacated its temporary restraining order on the same
day.20 The plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege that Secretary
Chertoff's waiver authority violated the separation of powers principles in
Articles I and II of the Constitution.21
The Amended Complaint requested that the court declare the
waiver authority granted to the Secretary of DHS 22 and the Secretary's
1 Id. at 2-3.
15 Chertoff 527 F.Supp.2d at 121, at 121.16id..
17 Amended Complaint at 1, Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.Supp.2d 119
(D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-1801).
8 Chertoff 527 F.Supp.2d at 121.
9 Chertoff 527 F.Supp.2d at 121-22..
20 Chertoff 527 F.Supp.2d, at 123.
21 Id.
22 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); 8 U.S.C. §
1103 note (2000).
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waiver of nineteen laws23 unconstitutional and requested that the court set
aside the waiver authority and the Secretary's exercise of that waiver in
connection with the border wall.24 Next, the plaintiffs requested the court
to declare that the defendants have violated NEPA, the Arizona-Idaho
Conservation Act of 1988, and the APA, and to order the defendants to
prepare a regional and comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") assessing and disclosing the environmental impacts caused by the
construction of the border wall and consider reasonable alternatives that
comply with NEPA.25
The plaintiffs then requested that the court set aside the right-of-
way granted to the Corps by the BLM on August 31, 2007, and require
defendants to remediate any environmental effects of the border wall and
road construction to come into compliance with all applicable laws. 26
Lastly, the plaintiffs requested that the court enjoin defendants from
constructing any border wall until they come into compliance with all
applicable environmental laws. 27 The defendants moved to dismiss the
amended complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), arguing that the waiver
provision is constitutionally permissible under the Supreme Court's
"nondelegation" cases.28
At trial, the court considered one issue: whether the DHS
Secretary's waiver of nineteen laws violated the separation of powers.29
The court distinguished the waiver clause from the power to partially
repeal or amend laws at issue in Clinton v. City of New York" on the
ground that the waiver clause at issue did not alter the text of any statute. 3 1
The court stated that the laws waived by Secretary Chertoff still had the
same legal force as when they were passed.32 However, they would now
23 72 Fed. Reg. 60,870 (Oct. 26, 2007).
24 Amended Complaint at 14, Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.Supp.2d 119
(D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-1801).
25 Id. at 14.
26 id.
27 id.
2 8 Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.Supp.2d 119, 123 (D.D.C. 2007)
29 d
30 Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
3' Chertoff 527 F.Supp.2d 119 at 124.32 d
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not apply to the extent they used to with respect to the border wall
*33construction.
The court also stated that the executive branch has traditionally
been allowed a larger degree of discretion in matters relating to foreign
affairs and immigration, and the REAL ID Act's waiver provisions relates
to such issues. 34 Therefore, the court held that a congressional delegation
of power comports with the separation of powers when the lawmakers
include an "intelligible principle" within a statute that narrows the exercise
of legislative power delegated to the Executive Branch to a level "not
lower or higher than necessary."35
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Non-Delegation Doctrine
Separation of powers and the non-delegation doctrine have guided
the Supreme Court since at least 1892, when it concluded in Field v. Clark
that Congress could not delegate legislative authority to the president. 36
Field considered whether the Tariff Act of 1890,37 conferring authority on
the president to levy duties on items imported from other countries, was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 38 The Court concluded
that to violate the non-delegation doctrine, a delegated power must be
legislative in nature. 39 The court found that the President's duties under
33 id
34 Id. at 12.
3 Id. at 127 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474, 476 (2001)).
36Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
3 1 d. at 662-63. The statute provided that "[s]o often as the President shall be satisfied
that the government of any country.. .imposes duties or other exactions upon the
agricultural or other products of the United States.. .he may deem to be reciprocally
unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty to suspend, by
proclamation to that effect, the provisions of this act relating to the free introduction of
sugars, molasses, coffee, tea and hides... and during such suspension duties shall be
levied, collected, and paid..." Id. at 680.
38 id.
39 Id. at 693-94. The court stated that legislative power was a policy making function. Id.
at 693.
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40the Act were fact finding, rather than legislative, and upheld the statute.
Additionally, the Court noted that the Act set forth specific procedures that
kept the President from exercising his own discretion.41
During the New Deal, the Court took a different approach to strike
down statutory provisions for violating the non-delegation doctrine. In
Panama Refining v. Ryan,42 the Court held that a section of the National
Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA") was unconstitutional for delegating
broad authority to the President without an "intelligible principle" to guide
his decisions. 3 The NIRA authorized the President to decide whether
interstate shipments of petroleum products were excessive, to prohibit
such shipments, and to impose criminal penalties." The Court found that
Congress had delegated legislative powers by failing to delineate policy or
standard for the President to make his findings. 45
Similarly, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, the
Court struck down another NIRA section for granting the President
discretion over trade group and industry conditions. 46 When analyzing the
statute, the Court again found that the authority Congress had delegated to
the President gave him the power to enact law, contrary to the separation
of powers doctrine.47
After 1935, the Supreme Court again changed its position by
routinely upholding broad congressional delegations of authority.
Mistretta v. United States served as a prime example of the continued
49loosening of the non-delegation doctrine. Congress created an
independent agency, the United States Sentencing Commission, to create
federal sentencing guidelines.50 John Mistretta, sentenced to 18 months in
prison and three years' probation for selling cocaine, alleged that the
4 Id. at 693-94.
41 Id.
42 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
43 Id. at 429-30.
"Id. at 406 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 709(c) (1933)).
451 Id. at 418-19, 430.
4 6 A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935).
47 d
48 See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The New Deal Court: Emergence ofa New Reason, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1973, 1979 n.31 (1990).
49 Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
'0 Id. at 367-68.
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Sentencing Commission exercised unconstitutional legislative authority.5
The Court noted that Congress' need for administrative support called for
flexibility in non-delegation jurisprudence. 52 It upheld the delegation on
the ground that when Congress enunciates an "intelligible principle,"
separation of powers principles may bend to allow Congress necessary
flexibility in its duties.5 3 Again, the Supreme Court said that Congress
must enunciate "intelligible principles" to guide the administrative
agencies that carry out its policies. 54
The two basic principles of the separation of powers cases are that
the branches of government must maintain a degree of separation and the
branches should be allowed to depend on one another to allow a workable
government.5" However, courts drew differing lines in each case.56 The
deciding factor in each case depended on whether the court viewed the
separation of powers doctrine formally, such as in the New Deal cases, or
functionally, such as in Mistretta.
B. The Presentment Clause
In Clinton, two groups of plaintiffs filed suit against the President
58for exercising his cancellation powers under the Line Item Veto Act. A
district court struck down the Act, and the Supreme Court affirmed. 59
Rather than applying the non-delegation doctrine, the Supreme Court
found that the President's cancellation power under the Line Item Veto
Act violated the Presentment Clause by avoiding constitutional procedures
for repealing statutes. 60 The Court held that even if part of the canceled
stId. at 371
52 Id. at 372.
s3 Id.
54 Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,472-76 (2001).
ss Thomas Charles Woodworth, Meet the Presentment Clause: Clinton v. New York, 60
LA. L. REv. 349, 366 (Fall 1999).
56 id.
s7 id.
ss Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998).
s9 City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F.Supp. 168, 178-79 (D.D.C.), af'd 524 U.S. 417
1998).
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439.
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section retained some legal effect, the cancellation was the functional
equivalent of a partial repeal.
The Clinton court distinguished the President's cancellation power
under the Line Item Veto Act from the President's power to suspend
import duties in Field. First, the court noted that the suspension of import
duties was contingent on a condition that did not exist at the time the
Tariff Act was passed, while the President's power of cancellation under
the Line Item Veto Act was based on the same conditions evaluated by
Congress when it passed the statute. The next distinction was the higher
amount of discretion allowed to the President under the Line Item Veto
Act, compared with the standard that an import duty be "reciprocally
unequal and unreasonable" before the President could suspend an
exemption in Field. Lastly, the court noted that the President was acting
pursuant to policies embodied in the statute when duties were suspended
under Field, while, under the Line Item Veto Act, the President was acting
on his own policy judgments.
C. Post-9/11 Immigration Reform
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress created
the National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
("9/11 Commission").62 The 9/11 Commission prepared a report detailing
its findings on the circumstances leading up to the attacks and providing
recommendations for Congress to prevent future attacks. 3  The
Commission report cited immigration as an underlying cause of the United
State's vulnerability to terrorist attacks.6 The 108th Congress considered
two bills to implement the recommendations: H.R. 10, the 9/11
61 Id.at 440.
6 2 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATIACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES xv (2004)
http://govinfo.1ibrary.unt.edu/911/report/91 Report.pdf [hereafter 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT].
63 1d. at 416.
4Id. at 66, 199.
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Recommendations and Implementations Act ("9/11 RIA");6 5 and S.B.
2845, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act ("IRTPA").
The IRTPA was drafted by a bipartisan group of senators to gain
majority support for the bill. The bill received ninety-six votes in its
favor. However, the 9/11 RIA was drafted by only Republicans and
included many controversial immigration provisions. It was not until two
months after the House passed 9/11 RIA and the Senate passed IRTPA,
that an agreement was reached and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 passed both houses and was signed into law by the
President.67 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 was stripped of 9/11 RIA's immigration provisions, only on the
agreement that the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, James
Sensenbrenner, could include the immigration in the first must-pass bill in
the 109th Congress. 68
Representative Sensenbrenner introduced H.R. 18: The Real ID
Act of 2005 on January 26, 2005.69 As promised, the immigration
provisions excluded from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 had been attached to "must pass" appropriation
measures for troops in Iraq and tsunami relief.70 A major provision of the
act included the waiver of laws to facilitate physical barriers along the
United States borders and to improve border infrastructure. 7 1
The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (IIRIRA) provided for constructing barriers along the United
States borders and allowed the Attorney General to waive specified
environmental restrictions to the extent he or she deemed necessary to
65 H.R. 10, 108th Cong. (2004).
66 S. 2845, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted).
67 Ed Henry & Ted Barret, House approves intelligence bill: Senate scheduled to vote on
reform bill Wednesday, CNN (Dec. 8, 2004),
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/12/07/intelligence.bill/index.html.
68 Joan Friedland, REAL ID Act sent to Senate in "must pass" emergency appropriations
bill, http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/DLs/DL022.htm69 H.R. 418, 109th Cong. (2005).
70 H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. (2005).
1 Id.
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guarantee prompt construction of the barriers.72 Because barrier
construction was delayed due to state coastal laws,7 3 Congress attempted
to avoid a similar situation by adding a provision to the REAL ID Act the
Secretary of Homeland Security broad waiver authority. 74
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Presentment Clause
District Judge Ellen Segal Huwelle decided the case. 75 She first
rejected the Plaintiffs' argument that the waiver authority in the REAL ID
Act was unconstitutional under Clinton v. City of New York. 6 The court
held that President Clinton had "unilateral power to change the text of
duly enacted statutes" so that they no longer had "any legal force or
effect," while the REAL ID Act waiver did not alter the text of any
77statute.
Judge Huwelle stated that the laws waived by Chertoff still had the
same legal force as when they were passed. 8 The effect of Chertoff's
waiver was only that the laws would not apply with respect to the border
wall construction.7 9  Additionally, if the waiver provision was declared
unconstitutional, many other authorizations of executive waivers would
suffer the same fate. 8
The court noted that, while Clinton identified three critical
differences between itself and Field, it did not adopt a test based on those
72 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(A)(ii)(2005)).
7 3 MICHAEL JOHN CARCIA ET. AL, OPEN CRS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF H.R. 418, THE REAL ID ACT OF
2005 [hereinafter CRS Immigration Report] 10,
http://w2.eff.org/Activism/realid/analysis.pdf.
74 at 11.
" Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.Supp.2d 119,120 (D.D.C. 2007).
76Id. at 124; Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
7 Chertoff 527 F.Supp.2d 119 at 123-26 (citing Clinton, 524 U.S. at 437).





factors for determining when a waiver provision is constitutional.8 ' The
three factors were not applicable to the deciding factor in Clinton, because
in Clinton the veto was the "functional equivalent of repeals of acts of
Congress" and in Field the suspensions under the tariff act "were not
exercises of legislative power." 82  Finally, the court stated that the
distinction between Clinton and Field also depended on the fact that the
Tariff Act in Field was in "the foreign affairs arena," where the executive
branch has a higher degree of discretion. 83 The court held that, similarly,
the REAL ID Act's relation to foreign affairs would allow the executive to
exercise greater discretion. 84
B. Separation ofPowers
When addressing the Plaintiffs' separation of powers argument, the
court focused on Mistretta v. U.S., 85 and the considerations the Supreme
Court laid down there to determine the propriety of waiver authority. 86
Mistretta held that delegation of power to the executive branch is
permissible when Congress "lays down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to exercise the delegated
authority is directed to .conform."87 Judge Huwelle considered that the
statute required the DHS Secretary to determine whether a waiver is
"necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads." 88
The court also noted that the barriers and roads were to be constructed
only in areas of "high illegal entry into the United States." " When
applying these considerations to the waiver provision at issue, the court
upheld the policy as "clearly delineated." 90
81 Id. at 125 (discussing Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark. 143 U.S. 649 (1892)).82 Id. (quoting Clinton, 524 U.S. at 444).
83 Id. at 125-26.
8 Id. at 126.
81 Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
6 Chertoff 527 F.Supp.2d at 127.7 Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372).
SId. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (2007)).
SId. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (2007)).
9 Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73.)
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Finally, the court addressed the Plaintiffs' argument that the REAL
ID Act waiver provision was of a scope "unprecedented in our history,"
because it allowed an appointed official to waive any law, while other
waiver provisions applied to specific laws or provisions of laws." The
court noted that the Secretary was authorized to exercise only the authority
for the "expeditious completion of the border fences authorized by IIRIRA
in areas of high illegal entry." 92 Thus, the court held that the scope of the
waiver authority was sufficiently limited. 93
In its conclusion, the court held that it lacked the power to
invalidate the waiver provision simply because of "the unlimited number
of statutes that could potentially be encompassed by the Secretary's
exercise of his waiver power."94  Instead, under the nondelegation
doctrine, the court found it must determine "whether Congress has laid
down an intelligible principle to guide the executive branch, not the scope
of the waiver power." 95 Therefore, the court held that the REAL ID Act's
waiver provision constitutionally delegated waiver authority to the DHS
Secretary and granted the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 96
V. COMMENT
The decision in Chertoff allowed ephemeral policy pressures to
override solid constitutional considerations. The D.C. District Court
overlooked the factors distinguishing the Department of Homeland
Security's waiver authority from such authority at issue in earlier
decisions. Chertoff goes beyond offending environmental concerns to also
affect humanitarian, philosophical, and deep-rooted constitutional issues.
As the consequences of the decision begin to take shape, Chertoff
probably will not survive the critical eye of the future.
A. The Presentment Clause versus the Non-delegation Doctrine
9' Id. at 128.
92 Id. (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Sierra Club v. Ashcroft, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
44244, at *20).
93 id.





Clinton is the most recent decision analyzing issues similar to
Chertoff Clinton makes an interesting departure from previous case law
by its use of the Presentment Clause, rather than the non-delegation
doctrine, to strike down the Line Item Veto Act. Another factor that
distinguished Clinton from other non-delegation decisions is it that
analyzed the issue under circumstances where Congress delegates
cancellation authority, rather than legislative authority, to the executive
branch.
Chertoff also involved the delegation of cancellation authority, but
the court refrained from deciding that under the Presentment Clause.
Instead, the court held that Congress had articulated an "intelligible
principle" to guide the DHS Secretary's waiver power.97
Clinton 's Presentment Clause rationale rested on the argument that
the cancellations at issue were unilateral repeals by the President of
statutes at issue. 98 The defendants argued that the statutory provisions still
had a "real, legal budgetary effect," because there was no textual changes
to the law and the statutes were left intact as they were written. 99
However, the majority concluded that even though the provisions still
retained some legal effect, the fact that the provisions were "entirely
inoperative as to appellees" rendered them the equivalent of a partial
repeal in violation of the Presentment Clause.' 00
Chertoff held that the laws waived by the Secretary of Homeland
Security retained the "same legal force and effect" as when they were
passed, but only "no longer apply to the extent they otherwise would have
with respect" to the border fence construction. 01 Because the laws still
retained some legal effect, the court found that the waiver was not an
unconstitutional "partial repeal" of the environmental laws.' 02 However,
applying the logic of Clinton, the laws waived by the Secretary were
"entirely inoperative" as to the plaintiffs. Because the environmental laws
no longer applied to the land that the plaintiffs had an interest in
97 Id. at 127 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372).
9'Id. at 124.





Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 16, No. I
protecting, the waiver could be considered a partial repeal in violation of
the Presentment Clause.
Chertoff stated that Clinton's discussion of Field v. Clark did
nothing to support the plaintiffs' argument.' 03 Clinton distinguished the
cancellation power of the Line Item Veto Act from that in Field by noting
three key differences.' 04  First, the Presidential power to suspend the
exemption of import duties in Field depended on a condition that did not
exist when Congress passed the Tariff Act. 05 Second, the President had
limited discretion and could suspend exemptions only if the necessary
contingency existed that allowed him to exercise his cancellation
power.lo6 Lastly, the President's exercise of his cancellation power was
pursuant to the policy judgments of Congress, rather than his own policy
judgments. 07
When analyzing Chertoff under these three factors, the necessary
condition in the statute that allows the DHS Secretary to waive laws
appears to be his own determination that a waiver is "necessary to ensure
expeditious construction of the barriers and roads.. .to deter illegal
crossings in areas of high illegal entry." 0 8 First, it is impossible to know
whether the DHS Secretary's personal determination to waive laws
environmental laws affecting the border construction existed at the time
Congress passed the REAL ID act. But, the "areas of high illegal entry"
that would be subject to Chertoff's discretion were clearly ascertainable in
2005 when Congress passed the REAL ID Act.
Additionally, although the DHS Secretary's policy judgments in
deciding to waive the laws may have reflected the policy reasons
embodied in the REAL ID Act, the conditions necessary for him to make
such policy judgments already existed when Congress passed the Act. In
his dissent in Clinton, Justice Breyer argued that separation of powers
principles should be considered "in light of the need for a 'workable
government."'l09 However, here it appears that Congress's delegation of
0 Id.
"s Id. at 443.
o0 Id. at 443-44.
07 id. at 444.
o0 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2000).
" Clinton, 524 U.S. at 473.
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authority was an attempt to avoid making difficult policy decisions, rather
than a delegation that was necessary to ensure a workable government.
Even though the necessary conditions for the DHS Secretary's
policy decisions existed when the REAL ID Act was passed, Chertoff
avoided analyzing the Act's waiver provision under Clinton 's three factors
distinguishing Field. Rather, Chertoff held that the three differences
articulated by Clinton were not a three-part test to be used in determining
a waiver's constitutionality."10 Instead, the court believed the deciding
factor in Clinton was that the "cancellations under the Line Item Veto Act
were the 'functional equivalent of repeals of Acts of Congress.""" Since
the court had incorrectly held that the waivers were not partial repeals, it
found that the DHS Secretary was acting in compliance with the statute in
exercising his waiver authority.1 12
Even if the court was correct in its determination that the three
factors articulated in Clinton were not applicable, there is a valid argument
that the DHS Secretary's waiver was a partial repeal since it rendered the
laws "entirely inoperative" as to the plaintiffs' interests. If a court were to
employ the logic of the Clinton majority and deem the waivers in Chertoff
to be partial repeals, this "deciding factor" of Clinton would lead to the
conclusion that the delegation of legislative authority at issue in Chertoff
is unconstitutional.
The Chertoff court also relies on the arguments that the authority
delegated to the executive in the REAL ID Act is permissible due to the
Executive Branch's greater discretion in foreign affairs and immigration
matters.11 3 To support this argument, the court again relies on Clinton
court's analysis of Field.114 Clinton distinguished the Line Item Veto Act
from the Tariff Act on the ground that the former relates to "the foreign
affair arena," where the President has "a degree of discretion and freedom
from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic
affairs alone involved." 5
1o Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.Supp.2d 119, 125 (D.D.C. 2007).
" Id at 125 (quoting Clinton, 524 U.S. at 444).
12 Id. at 125.
"' Id. at 126.
14d.
"
5 Id. (quoting Clinton, 524 U.S. at 445).
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First, it is worth noting that the Clinton court did not expressly
include immigration in its "foreign affair area."1 1 6 It is arguable that the
immigration issue cannot be categorized in the same vein as typical
foreign affairs, and instead is a domestic issue. Immigration legislation
does not involve careful negotiation with other countries that would justify
presidential involvement. Rather, immigration legislation is a unilateral
decision by the United States to promote solely a domestic agenda.
Additionally, Chertoff fails to address the distinction between
delegating authority to the President and delegating authority to an
unelected member of the executive branch. Both the President and
Congress, as elected officials, stand accountable to their constituents for
the difficult policy decisions they make. However, the DHS Secretary as
an appointed member of the executive branch has no accountability to the
people.
Rather than choosing between the Presentment Clause and the non-
delegation doctrine, Chertoff picked and chose pieces between the two.
The court carefully selected parts of Clinton and parts of other non-
delegation doctrine decisions to construct a messy combination of
constitutional doctrine that is unlikely to provide the much-needed
guidance for future courts deciding similar issues.
B. Separation of Powers
After deciding that the REAL ID Act was a constitutional
delegation of waiver authority to the DHS Secretary, the court did not
decide the Plaintiffs' separation of powers argument. Courts have been
reluctant to take on the difficult task on balancing the non-delegation
doctrine against separation of powers principles. The majority in Clinton
made it clear that the decision addressed only the issue concerning the
"finely wrought procedure commanded by the Constitution."" 7 However,
in his concurrence Justice Kennedy argued that the structure of the
"16Id. at 125-26 (quoting Clinton, 524 U.S. at 445).
"' Clinton, 524 U.S. at 447.
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Constitution "requires a stability which transcends the convenience of the
moment."18
Justice Kennedy stated that allowing political branches to
"reallocate their own authority" threatens the liberties of individual
citizens. 119 He stated that "[1]iberty is always at stake when one or more
of the branches seeks to transgress the separation of powers."l 2 0 Most
statutes delegating legislative authority do not seek to enhance the power
of the branch of government receiving the legislative authority, but Justice
Kennedy argued that these are the "undeniable effects." 121 He finds that
such laws "gives the President the sole ability to hurt a group that is a
visible target, in order to disfavor the group or to extract further
concessions from Congress."1 22
There is little doubt that Justice Kennedy would be similarly
troubled with the REAL ID Act's delegation of authority to the DHS
Secretary, which compromises the liberty of individuals who no longer
have their interests represented in the DHS Secretary's legislative
decisions. As Justice Kennedy says, "[t]he citizen has a vital interest in
the regularity of the exercise of governmental power." 23
Some argue that when Congress voluntarily delegates its
legislative authority to another branch, the delegation does not threaten
separation of powers principles. Justice Kennedy responds by stating that
"[a]bdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design."
The Chertoff court argued that the DHS Secretary is acting as Congress
has expressly directed by exercising his waiver authority. Under Justice
Kennedy's theory, the court's argument becomes irrelevant. Congress's
concession of its own authority and consent to the DHS Secretary's
actions do not satisfy the constitutional constraints envisioned by the
Framers.
C. Environmental Consequences
' Id at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119 Id.
o Id at 450.
121 Id. at 451.
122 
5.123 Id at 452.
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In the history of Arizona's borderlands, sightings of the jaguar
were once a consistent occurrence.124 But during the 1970s, the livestock
industry almost succeeded in eradicating the species from the state. 125It
was not until 1996 that two jaguars began to appear around the Arizona
borderlands.126 Biologists and wildlife experts flocked to the state to
search for and study these rare creatures. 27 Since then it has since been
speculated that one breeding pair may be living in remote areas of the
Arizona border region. 128 The reemergence of the animals in the United
States is the result of a migratory corridor used by the jaguars to move
between the United States and Mexico.129 The fencing and road projects
are destined to cut off this migration.' 30
The jaguar is not the only species threatened to disappear
altogether from the United States. The Sonoran pronghorn, which
previously was found throughout southern Arizona and northern Mexico,
has been reduced to an estimated twenty-one animals now living in the
United States.131 Due to its limited ability to jump, fences have become
an obstacle for the pronghorns.132 Along with fences, paved roads have
also contributed to the destruction of the pronghorn habitat.'33 With the
border fence construction now underway, it is speculated that the
pronghorn is threatened with extinction.1 34
The conservation of numerous plant and wildlife depends on
effective cross-border management between the United States and
Mexico.' 3 5 The construction of the borderland may destroy international





129 See id. at 18-19.
130 id.




135 Id. at 7.
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efforts and abilities to protect wildlife and habitat.' 6 The damage may be
irreparable for some plant and wildlife habitats. 1 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The court's decision in Chertoff is disappointing in many respects.
As an environmental issue, it shows the judiciary's support for the quick
construction of a controversial wall that will have devastating effects on
some of the United State's most treasured lands. Additionally, the court
avoids the difficult task of taking a clear position on an evolving
constitutional issue. But lastly, the policy implications of the decision
only deepen the divide between the government and the people who live
with the consequences its decisions. Kat Rodriguez of the community
organization, Derechos Humanos, says "The walls are so awful. On a
human level, there is something very traumatic about the way they divide
people, divide families. People can't get through. Animals can't get
through. They are a symbol of division and failed policies."l 38
TANA M. SANCHEZ
3 1 d. at 7-8.
37 See generally On the Line, supra note 2.
38 Sierra Club, Tucson: Border Walls Put People and the Environment At Risk,
http://www.sierraclub.org/comunidades/ingles/tucson.asp
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